

Volby na Slovensku očami medzinárodných pozorovateľov

OBSE/ODIHR zverejnila svoju finálnu správu k slovenským prezidentským voľbám (marec-apríl 2024) a expertná organizácia Election Watch k voľbám do Európskeho parlamentu (jún 2024)

VOLBY 2024 NA SLOVENSKU OČAMI MEDZINÁRODNÝCH POZOROVATEĽOV

Experti MEMO 98 sa dlhodobo (od roku 1999) zúčastňujú volebných pozorovateľských misií a expertných hodnotiacich tímov. Počas viac ako 25 rokov mali možnosť participovať, predovšetkým v rámci OBSE/ODIHR a EÚ, ale aj v tímoch iných medzinárodných organizácií, na viac ako 150 misiách, a to v rozličných pozíciách (zástupca šéfa misie, mediálny analytik, analytik sociálnych médií, politický analytik, hovorca). Zároveň MEMO 98 pravidelne poskytuje expertnú bázu a spoluprácu mnohým volebným a hodnotiacim misiám pôsobiacim na Slovensku.

V posledných týždňoch svojej záverečnej správy týkajúcej sa slovenského volebného procesu v roku 2024 zverejnili pozorovateľské misie dvoch medzinárodných organizácií - [OSCE/ODIHR](#) (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) a [Election Watch](#).

Nižšie nájdete ich krátky prehľad (stručné zhrnutie, zvýraznenia hlavných zistení je dielom MEMO 98, a odporúčania) v angličtine (preklad bude k dispozícii v priebehu decembra).

Záverečná správa expertného volebného tímu OBSE/ODIHR



Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

SLOVAK REPUBLIC

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

23 March and 6 April 2024

ODIHR Election Expert Team
Final Report



Warsaw
22 November 2024

Finálna správa **misie OBSE/ODIHR** (zatiaľ iba v angličtine), zverejnená 22. novembra je dostupná [na tomto linku](#). Iné finálne správy volebných misií OBSE/ODIHR na Slovensku (naposledy pri parlamentných voľbách 2023) sú dostupné [na tomto linku](#) (aj v slovenčine). Nižšie nájdete stručné zhrnutie (Executive Summary) a odporúčania (Recommendations).

Executive Summary

Following an invitation from the authorities of the Slovak Republic and in accordance with its mandate, **the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed an Election Expert Team (EET) for the 2024 presidential election.** The ODIHR EET focused its assessment on the conduct of the campaign, including on social networks, campaign finance regulation and oversight, and the work of the media. The ODIHR EET assessed compliance of these aspects of the electoral process with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as national legislation.

The election was competitive and pluralistic, conducted with respect for fundamental freedoms and offering voters a choice of distinct political alternatives. However, the blurring of the line between the duties of public officials and campaigning and cases of prohibited third-party campaigning lessened the equality of conditions for all candidates. Despite campaign finance transparency rules in place, remaining gaps and insufficient oversight and enforcement leave space for non-transparent practices and limited accountability for evasion. Media covered the campaign extensively through various formats, while the overall media environment has been increasingly affected by the animosity towards critical media, harassment of journalists, and attempts of political influence on editorial policies.

The campaign reflected the polarization and underlying pro- and anti-government divisions, revolving mostly around the course the president would take in foreign policy and ensuring the balance of powers. The war in Ukraine was instrumentalized, especially before the second round, through messaging presenting one of the main contenders, Ivan Korčok, as a warmonger. Candidates' campaign programmes contained mostly generic mentions of measures targeting women, persons with disabilities, and minorities. Positively, in contrast to the preceding parliamentary elections, the campaign remained overall courteous, and candidates largely avoided the use of aggressive, inflammatory, or intolerant rhetoric, including towards various vulnerable societal groups. Throughout the campaign, the winning candidate, Peter Pellegrini, endorsed by the governing coalition parties, relied on the combined role and numerous appearances as the Speaker of Parliament, profiting from the visibility and the boosted image of an effective statesperson.

Campaign finance regulations provide an overall adequate disclosure and accountability framework, including the requirement for candidates to use transparent bank accounts for all campaign transactions. However, the effectiveness of these provisions was undermined by non-transparent bulk payments to PR agencies, contributions from political parties not revealing the actual donors, unaccounted-for in-kind support, and prohibited third-party spending. Despite several allegations and complaints about campaign finance irregularities, no corrective action was taken during the campaign by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) as the oversight body. Detracting from transparency, the MoI is also not required to publish any reports on its monitoring and enforcement activities concerning candidates' post-election campaign reports. Its broad responsibility, set by the campaign finance oversight rules, is contrary to good electoral practice, underscoring the importance of vesting this duty with an independent body.

Freedom of expression is respected overall, but at odds with international obligations, defamation remains a criminal offence. The media landscape is pluralistic, yet the concentration of major outlets raises concerns about their editorial independence. The absence of a transparent mechanism for the distribution of state advertising further exacerbates the vulnerability of the media market. **Concerns about the independence of the public service**

media have been raised due to its insufficient funding and attempts at political control through a newly adopted law following the elections. Furthermore, frequent attacks on media and intimidation of journalists, often by key political figures, pose significant risks to media pluralism. Manipulative content and false information circulated on certain online media known for spreading disinformation and on social networks but only to a limited extent originated from candidate-affiliated profiles.

In line with ODIHR's methodology, the EET did not undertake a comprehensive observation of election-day procedures. In a limited number of polling stations visited, the voting process was orderly and administered confidently and impartially by knowledgeable commission members. Many polling premises visited were not barrier-free for persons with reduced mobility. Election results were released swiftly and transparently, with a polling station breakdown.

This report offers recommendations to support efforts to further align elections in the Slovak Republic with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. Recommendations focus on the need to better ensure the separation between public functions and campaigning, improve regulations on spending limits, third parties, and reporting requirements, provide a timely remedy against irregularities, decriminalize defamation, guarantee transparency in the distribution of state advertising, and to ensure the independence and free environment for the work of the media and journalists. ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities in further improving the electoral process and addressing the recommendations in this and previous reports.

Recommendations

These recommendations, as contained throughout the text, are offered with a view to further enhance the conduct of elections in the Slovak Republic and to support efforts to bring them fully in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. These recommendations should be read in conjunction with past ODIHR recommendations that remain to be addressed. The legislative reforms should be undertaken well in advance of elections and through an inclusive consultation, including with civil society. ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities of the Slovak Republic to further improve the electoral process and to address recommendations contained in this and previous reports.

1. To enhance women's participation in public life, authorities should address gender stereotypes through comprehensive legal, institutional, and educational measures. Political parties and other stakeholders should identify and curb gender-based discriminatory rhetoric and actions that lead to the negative portrayal of women and affect their equal participation.
2. To harmonize the legal framework and to ensure impartiality, the State Election Commission should be entrusted with the registration of presidential candidates. The law should prescribe procedures for the review of submitted applications and the approval of candidacies.
3. The deadline for the withdrawal of candidates should be reviewed to allow sufficient time for reflecting the changes on printed ballots. Voter information and communication about the withdrawals should be improved to support voters' ability to cast valid and fully informed votes.
4. The law should provide for a clear separation between official functions and campaigning to prevent candidates and public officials from using the advantage of office for electoral purposes. As previously recommended, provisions to ban the use of public resources for campaign purposes should be considered. This could include a prohibition on initiating social welfare programmes through public funds during the official campaign periods.

5. Campaign-related violations should be promptly addressed, including through timely remedial action and the imposition of proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
6. Relevant authorities should develop, in co-operation with Roma organizations, long-term civic education and election awareness programmes to encourage meaningful and informed electoral participation by Roma voters.
7. To further enhance transparency and accountability, the law should comprehensively regulate the use of loans by presidential candidates.
8. In line with good practice, the spending limits could be based on a form of indexation or regularly reviewed to account for inflation.
9. The ban on third-party campaign financing should be reviewed to balance between ensuring the freedom of expression while, at the same time, setting reasonable limits on third-party spending to prevent undue distortion of the campaign.
10. Provisions for campaign reporting by candidates should require the disclosure of information on financial donations received, including from political parties. To enable the verification of information in reports about in-kind contributions and gratuitous services received, candidates could be required to attach the itemized records about such contributions, including in-kind support provided by political parties, to financial reports.
11. To strengthen oversight and to enhance transparency, the Ministry of Interior could be mandated by law to prepare and publish the conclusions on its monitoring and enforcement activities in connection with candidates' financial reports within a reasonable timeframe.
12. An independent body could be vested with campaign finance oversight responsibilities.
13. The allocation of state advertising should be transparent, non-discriminatory, and regulated based on clear and objective criteria.
14. To protect the public broadcaster from political influence, adequate safeguards should be introduced in law and in practice to guarantee its editorial independence, financial sustainability, and the appointment of professional, politically unaffiliated management and oversight bodies.
15. Authorities should swiftly investigate threats, including online, against journalists. Political actors should refrain from the use of derogatory or aggressive language targeting journalists, which may encourage such attacks.
16. As previously recommended, defamation should be decriminalized, in line with international obligations on freedom of expression.

[Prezidentské volby 2024](#) - Finálna správa volebného expertného tímu OBSE/ODIHR k prezidentským voľbám 2024 (23. marec a 6. apríl 2024) - [v angličtine](#).

[Predčasné parlamentné volby 2023](#) - Finálna správa volebnej pozorovateľskej misie OBSE/ODIHR k predčasným parlamentným voľbám 2023 (30. september 2023) - [v slovenčine](#), [v angličtine](#).

**Závěrečná správa volebnej hodnotiacej misie
ELECTION WATCH**



ELECTION ASSESSMENT MISSION

FINAL REPORT

European Parliament Elections
6 - 9 June 2024

SEPTEMBER 2024

Organizácia **Election Watch** zverejnila svoju finálnu správu (zatiaľ iba v angličtine) k voľbám do Európskeho parlamentu (EP) 30. septembra, a je dostupná [na tomto linku](#). Správa analyzuje

podmienky volebných procesov a aplikáciu volebných pravidiel vo všetkých 27 členských štátoch Európskej únie. MEMO 98 sa misie zúčastnilo ako expert za Slovensko (misia predstavila svoju predbežnú správu 10. júna, viac [na tomto linku](#)). Nižšie nájdete stručné zhrnutie (Executive Summary) a odporúčania (Recommendations).

Executive Summary

Democracy was tested on various levels in the 10th European Parliament (EP) elections. **A total of 355 million eligible voters across the 27 Member States (MS) elected 720 Members of the EP to represent the more than 425 million European citizens for the next five years.**

National political parties and candidates campaigned increasingly on shared European issues, but with little visibility of their European political families and their lead candidates in MS. Acts of violence against politicians in some MS were a pronounced sign of a growing societal polarisation, compounded by fears of a wider political rift and concerns about foreign interference.

European Union (EU) bodies have initiated and advanced electoral reforms, enhancing the broader rights framework. Yet, significant differences and restrictions on voting and candidacy rights remain, and important reforms aimed at increasing the cohesion of electoral rules and procedures across the Union have yet to be completed. **The distribution of the 720 EP seats among MS for the next term meets EU Treaty requirements and reduced disparities in the weight of the vote between MS, but a permanent seat distribution method based on objective criteria remains to be developed by 2026. Suffrage rights were expanded in a few MS. Belgium and Germany joined Austria and Malta in lowering the voting age to 16 years, resulting in a total of two million eligible voters below the age of 18. Belgium also reduced the candidacy age to 18, while it remained 25 in Greece and Italy.**

The elections were administered by the 27 national election authorities and enjoyed high public trust overall. The European cooperation network on elections (ECNE) has become a valuable forum for facilitating contacts between MS, mutual learning, and inspiring improvements. National representatives are increasingly coordinating and exchanging on good electoral practices. In the absence of a centralised European voter register, data exchange among MS on possible multiple entries remains a challenge, not least because data about dual citizenship is not available. Overall, the confidence in voter registration procedures for the European elections is high, with the notable exception of Hungary and to a lesser extent Poland.

The proportional representation system is unequally implemented across MS, and there are different thresholds in place to obtain a mandate. Six MS do not foresee a preferential vote. Cyprus recently abolished compulsory voting, which remains in laws in four MS.

Although mostly not enforced, disproportionate fines envisaged include a temporary withdrawal of voting rights for repeated abstention (Belgium) and one-year imprisonment (Greece). Most EU countries offer voters advance and alternative voting options, such as voting from abroad, by post, or using a mobile ballot box, but access to alternative voting modalities and the number of options available still vary greatly. Four MS (Czechia, Ireland, Malta, Slovakia) do not offer any possibility of voting from abroad to their citizens.

Special measures foster electoral inclusion and representation among marginalised groups. Eleven countries have legislated quotas for women and some, like Italy, Spain and Portugal reinforce their effect through rank-order rules. With up to 25 million young people eligible to vote for the first time, youth candidates were not listed in electable positions in 15 MS, highlighting remaining barriers. There is no unified approach to citizenship education across the EU and youth remains underrepresented in EU decision-making, with 50 as average age of MEPs in the newly elected EP. Some EU MS provide special measures to facilitate

electoral participation of national minorities, however Roma, Europe's largest ethnic minority, have lost any direct political representation in the EP and measures to facilitate their political participation remain insufficient.

Participation of persons with disabilities in elections has improved and since 2019, Germany, France, Slovenia and Luxembourg have abolished restrictions on voting rights for persons under guardianship, to align with international obligations. Nevertheless, 13 MS do not grant voting rights, and even more restrict candidacy for persons under guardianship. Several countries improved their legislation to explicitly require polling station accessibility and ballot readability but accessibility remains an issue in most MS, especially in Cyprus and Malta.

Around 11 million mobile EU citizens (EU citizens living in another MS) were eligible to vote either in their country of residence or citizenship. Their turnout has been low in the past, and data about their participation remains opaque. Their registration in host countries is hampered by language barriers, a variety of registration deadlines, and administrative requirements. Mobile EU citizens could also stand as candidates in their country of residence, although procedures vary by MS. Comprehensive reforms to the EU directives to enhance the participation of mobile EU citizens are pending finalisation.

Around 18,400 candidates and 490 candidate lists stood on the ballots, competing under unequal conditions across the MS. Candidate registration and campaign periods ranged from several months to a few weeks, and independent individual candidacy is not possible in nine MS. Most national political parties have joined a European Political Party (EUPP), which nominated lead candidates (Spitzenkandidaten) for their campaigns, but followed different procedures in that regard.

A detailed campaign finance reporting framework overseen by an independent European authority enhances transparency and oversight of EUPPs, which are largely financed through public funding from the EU, with a steep increase to EUR 50 million available for grants in 2024. In contrast to the rules for monitoring donations, the authority does not have systematic access to activities-related expenditure information during the campaign.

The bulk of campaign expenditure takes place at the national level. National laws and regulations for political finance vary widely, with public funding, considered as a measure to enhance equality, not available in all MS. Ten MS do not have any campaign spending limits or bans on types of campaign expenditure in place. Requirements to reveal the sources and amounts of contributions, the purpose and amounts of expenses, and to make relevant reports timely and publicly available also differ. **Sanctions for campaign finance violations do not appear effective, dissuasive and proportionate, and the oversight body for campaign finance is not seen as fully independent, impartial and transparent in several MS.**

Online campaigning is covered by regulations in 16 MS, and the new European regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising will provide further guidance once fully in effect. The EU has adopted new legislation to regulate digital service providers, and the EC together with the new national Digital Services Coordinators (DSC), oversees enforcement. While most MS appointed these coordinators, twelve MS either had not designated the competent authority as DSC, or did not empower these authorities to perform the tasks required by the Act, or both. The EC took decisive action to hold these MS accountable by opening infringement procedures and has also begun investigating large online platforms, including deceptive political advertising and the discontinuation of a monitoring tool. A self-regulatory regime against disinformation has been set up to prevent, detect, take down or label disinformation online, accompanied by various fact checking initiatives and hybrid threat response mechanisms to protect against information

manipulation and interference.

While the EU generally remains a safe space for free and independent media, there are concerns pertaining to cases of arrests, surveillance, political pressure, and violence against journalists, as well as media ownership concentration. With another recently adopted legislation the EU attempts to protect media independence, freedom and pluralism, as well as journalists and non-governmental organisations from abusive cross-border lawsuits intended to silence or intimidate them.

European institutions emphasise the important role of civil society in safeguarding and promoting human rights and take measures to protect civic space. Yet, multiple civic space infringements have been reported for a number of MS, with the most concerning trends in Hungary and Slovakia. Non-partisan election observers have been globally recognised as human rights defenders, and the EC has urged MS to enable both international and citizen observation. Yet, only 7 MS have legal frameworks for both, and 9 MS do not have any provisions for election observation. Election-Watch.EU has applied in all 27 MS as international and citizen election observers and received accreditation in 13 MS.

The EP adjusted European turnout figures on its results website from 51.05 to 50.76 percent in September. There is still scope to improve accessibility to essential election information at European level and in most MS. All but two MS (Germany and Malta) publish detailed election results per polling station, in polling stations or online, to enhance transparency and public confidence. Electoral dispute resolution in the European elections is predominantly a matter for responsible national institutions. At least half of the MS define narrowly what complaints can be filed before election day. Decisions on final election results in seven MS are not subject to review and appeal in courts, which is at odds with international standards.

The 21 recommendations of this EAM report focus on advancing electoral reforms across the EU. Key proposals include intensifying collaboration between European institutions and MS to address inconsistencies in national electoral regulations and harmonising voting eligibility criteria. Recommendations emphasise increasing accessibility for persons with disabilities, enhancing women's participation, and promoting the inclusion of national minorities, youth, and mobile EU citizens. Efforts should be made to harmonise voter and candidate registration, enhance the European character of campaigns, and improve campaign finance transparency and oversight. Strengthening media freedom and the implementation of the new social media regulations are also recommended, along with the need for more robust mechanisms to handle electoral complaints, ensure independent election observation, and publish detailed election results to promote transparency and public trust.

Recommendations

Electoral reform process

1. European institutions and Member States need to intensify their collaborative efforts to advance the pending electoral reforms. It is essential to address past recommendations and persistent issues, including the lack of uniformity in national electoral regulations and the differing timelines for key electoral processes, which adversely impact the equality of rights and opportunities.

Electoral system

2. Sustained efforts are needed to identify a permanent method for the distribution of EP seats

among Member States. In line with international good practice, the distribution should be based on clear, transparent, and objective criteria and ensure transnational equality of the weight of the vote, while reconciling with EU Treaty requirements.

Suffrage rights

3. Reforms of electoral legislation at EU and Member State levels should continue to prioritise the widening and more uniform availability of advance and alternative voting methods to Union citizens.

4. To promote equality in voting and candidacy rights across the EU and reduce disparities in national suffrage approaches, renewed efforts should focus on establishing additional common European minimum eligibility criteria for voters and candidates. These criteria should aim to harmonise requirements for the minimum voting age, residency, independent candidacy, and permissible restrictions on suffrage rights.

Persons with disabilities

5. To enhance accessibility and inclusion of persons with disabilities in elections, it is essential to implement alternative voting methods such as postal and mobile voting, ensure physical accessibility of polling stations, and provide election information in multiple accessible formats. Additionally, training election staff, deploying assistive technologies, and engaging with Disabled Persons Organizations can significantly improve electoral participation for persons with disabilities.

Women participation

6. The EU and Member States should continue efforts to increase the participation and representation of women through legislative and voluntary measures. The collection and publication of gender-disaggregated data on electoral aspects should be further encouraged.

Inclusion of national minorities

7. To facilitate the inclusion of disadvantaged communities, the European institutions and its Member States should engage in increased awareness raising for the electoral participation of national minorities, including the Roma, and of other underprivileged groups, and should encourage special measures for their participation. Particular focus could be given to the use of minority languages for electoral materials and voter information.

Youth inclusion

8. The EU and its Member States should provide civic and voter education to young and first-time voters, including through school curricula and practical vote simulations, in a manner to ensure that no young voter is left behind.

Participation of mobile EU citizens

9. For enhanced inclusion of mobile EU citizens in European elections, Member States could streamline online registration, provide multilingual information, simplify registration procedures and raise public awareness, while harmonising further cut off dates for registration and strengthening data exchange mechanisms.

Voter registration

10. To enhance the accuracy, inclusivity and integrity of voter registers in European elections, it is

recommended that the EU and Member States consider further harmonisation of voter registration procedures, data format, and data exchange, while starting to identify double/multiple EU citizenship and conducting regular audits.

Candidate registration

11. Harmonising conditions for candidacy, including registration procedures and timelines, could enhance equality of chances and intraparty democratic practices in the European Parliament elections.

Campaign

12. To strengthen the European dimension of electoral campaigns and ensure equal opportunities for all candidates, efforts could be intensified to increase the visibility of European Political Parties, including on ballot papers, and harmonise electoral campaign regulations across all Member States.

Campaign finance

13. European institutions and Member States could jointly review the applicable rules for political party and campaign finance and its transparency and oversight, especially with regards to expenditure limits and disclosure requirements, and applicable sanctions in case of non-compliance.

14. Further consideration could be given to clarify the institutional responsibilities of oversight bodies and equip the respective independent authorities with sufficient powers to exercise their mandates, including the scrutiny of incomes, expenditures, and types of campaign activities.

Media environment

15. To foster media freedom and pluralism in Member States, the EC should monitor the enforcement of the European Media Freedom Act and in particular, verify how Member States implement measures to ensure that media have appropriate financial and technical resources to operate independently of political or corporate influence.

16. To enhance protection against the misuse of criminal and civil defamation laws, which are representing an essential threat to freedom of expression and journalistic freedom, the EC should oversee the transposition of the Anti-SLAPP Directive in national legislations and closely monitor its implementation.

Social media regulation

17. Continued efforts are necessary to ensure the full implementation of the DSA across all Member States. This includes providing adequate support and resources to national authorities, fostering collaboration and best practices, and conducting regular assessments to monitor progress and address any challenges promptly.

18. Online platforms should ensure transparency by adhering to agreed commitments and implementing DSA rules and mitigation measures. They must enhance efforts in combating information manipulation activities by improving mechanisms and establishing a multi-stakeholder approach through working groups and open discussions. Comprehensive, real-time data access needs to be provided to researchers for systematic monitoring and analysis, while maintaining user privacy and data security.

Complaints and appeals

19. Common guidelines on the handling of electoral disputes could be developed at the EU level. Reforms in Member States could prioritise the introduction of expedited deadlines to provide timely redress in electoral matters and ensuring a recourse to court against administrative decisions, including regarding final election results.

Election observation

20. To safeguard independent oversight, all Member States should include provisions in their legislation to explicitly allow access and accreditation of non-partisan election observers throughout the electoral process according to international principles.

Election results

21. To enhance transparency and independent oversight, Election Management Bodies should consistently publish detailed election results, including polling station data, the number of invalid votes, and data on voter demographics such as double citizens. Procedures for the aggregation of election results and calculation of voter turnout by the European Parliament should be clearly outlined and published.

Charts & Tables (within the Final report):

Table 1: Official results announced by national Election Management Bodies¹⁵⁴

Member State	total # of registered voters	total # of votes cast	% turnout as per MS EMB data	% turnout as per EP official website	total # of invalid votes as per MS EMB data	% invalid votes
Austria	6,372,204	3,584,482	56.25	56.25	60,548	1.69
Belgium	8,537,902	7,599,758	89.01	89.01	465,974	6.13
Bulgaria	6,170,472	2,073,730	33.78	33.78	61,238	2.95
Croatia	3,524,179	752,040	21.34	21.35	11,318	1.50
Cyprus	683,432	402,276	58.86	58.86	8,450	2.10
Czechia	8,212,628	2,993,252	36.45	36.45	22,793	0.76
Denmark	4,301,255	2,505,381	58.25	58.25	57,598	2.30
Estonia	980,014	368,925	37.64	37.60	950	0.26
Finland	4,546,589	1,835,762	40.38	40.40	6,513	0.35
France	49,462,981	25,470,451	51.49	51.49	716,689	2.81
Germany	61,963,020	40,114,939	64.74	64.74	304,450	0.76
Greece	9,814,685	4,062,092	41.39	41.39	55,293	1.36
Hungary	7,803,603	4,640,398	59.46	59.46	65,949	1.42
Ireland	3,554,450	1,800,226	50.65	50.65	54,996	3.05
Italy	51,214,348	24,740,230	48.31	48.31	774,735	3.13
Latvia	1,541,102	521,226	33.82	33.82	5,781	1.11
Lithuania	2,387,327	691,572	28.97	28.35	13,253	1.92
Luxembourg	319,410	262,676	82.24	82.24	11,784	4.49
Malta	370,184	270,142	72.98	73.00	9,884	3.66
Netherlands	13,542,363	6,253,467	46.18	46.18	11,607	0.19
Poland	29,098,155	11,831,590	40.66	40.65	67,731	0.57
Portugal	10,789,781	3,951,979	36.63	36.63	30,503	0.75
Romania	18,025,329	9,444,894	52.40	52.42	488,551	5.17
Slovakia	4,337,093	1,505,176	34.70	34.38	28,208	1.87
Slovenia	1,689,602	706,204	41.80	41.80	31,182	4.42
Spain	38,050,286	17,652,007	46.39	46.39 (49.21)	124,569	0.71
Sweden	7,942,272	4,240,459	53.39	53.39	42,448	1.00
Total	355,202,244	180,275,334	50.75	50.74 (51.05)	3,532,223	1.96

Regulations for election observation in the EU

ELECTION-WATCH.EU

- Both international and citizen election observation permitted by law, with accreditation (9)
- Only international election observation permitted by law, with accreditation (7)
- Accreditation for international and/or citizen observers without legal provisions (3)
- Voting and counting open to the public (10)
- No provisions (3)

Notes:

BE, EE, SK: No accreditation procedures
 AU, IT: International observers only by OSCE/ODIHR
 CZ, BE, LU: International observation only by organisations in which the country is a member
 CZ: International observers only for presidential elections
 SK: Observation limited to voting and counting on election day
 EE, FI: Law does not distinguish between international and citizen election observers




TABLE 1: SUFFRAGE RIGHTS

Member State	Voting age	Candidacy age	Voting rights granted to persons with intellectual & psychosocial disabilities & under guardianship	Voting rights restricted for prisoners	Voting rights extended to specified non-EU citizens	Independent candidates	Electoral threshold	Multi-member constituencies
Austria	16	18	yes	partly		lists with others	4 %	
Belgium	16	18	with limitations	partly		lists with others	none	yes (3)
Bulgaria	18	21	no	blanket		individual	none	
Croatia	18	18	yes			lists with others	5 %	
Cyprus	18	21	no		yes	individual	1.8 %	
Czechia	18	21	with limitations			within party lists	5 %	
Denmark	18	18	with limitations			no	none	
Estonia	18	21	no	blanket		individual	none	
Finland	18	18	yes			individual	none	
France	18	18	yes	partly		lists with others	5 %	
Germany	16	18	yes	partly		no	none	
Greece	17	25	yes	partly		no	3 %	
Hungary	18	18	with limitations	blanket		no	5 %	
Ireland	18	21	yes			individual	none	yes (3)
Italy	18	25	yes	partly		no	4 %	yes (5)
Latvia	18	21	yes			within party lists	5 %	
Lithuania	18	21	with limitations			no	5 %	
Luxembourg	18	18	yes	partly *		lists with others	none	
Malta	16	18	with limitations	blanket		individual	none	
Netherlands	18	18	yes	partly	yes	lists with others	none	
Poland	18	21	no	partly		lists with others	5 %	yes (13)
Portugal	18	18	with limitations	partly	yes	lists with others	none	
Romania	18	23	with limitations	partly *		individual	5 %	
Slovakia	18	21	yes			no	5 %	
Slovenia	18	18	yes			lists with others	none	
Spain	18	18	yes	partly		lists with others	none	
Sweden	18	18	yes			no	4 %	

TABLE 2: VOTING

Member State	Compulsory voting	Preferential voting	Out of country voting (postal or embassy)	Postal voting (in-country and abroad)	Advance voting	Mobile ballot box voting	Internet Voting & Electronic Voting	Proxy voting	Ballot paper (only one or one for each party)
Austria		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes			one
Belgium	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes		EV	yes	one
Bulgaria	yes	yes	yes			yes	EV		one
Croatia		yes	yes			yes			one
Cyprus		yes	yes						one
Czechia		yes				yes			each party
Denmark		yes	yes		yes				one
Estonia		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	IV		one
Finland		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes			one
France		closed list	yes	yes	yes		EV	yes	each party
Germany		closed list	yes	yes					one
Greece	yes	yes	yes	yes					each party
Hungary		closed list	yes	yes		yes			one
Ireland		yes	milit. & dipl. only	yes					one, STV
Italy		yes	yes			yes			one
Latvia		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes			each party
Lithuania		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes			one
Luxembourg	yes	yes	yes	yes					one
Malta		yes			yes				one, STV
Netherlands		yes	yes	yes				yes	one
Poland		yes	yes	yes		yes		limited	one
Portugal		closed list	yes	yes	yes	yes			one
Romania		closed list	yes			yes			one
Slovakia		yes				yes			each party
Slovenia		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes			one
Spain		closed list	yes	yes				limited	each party
Sweden		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes		limited	each party

TABLE 3: PARTY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Member State	Foreign funding permitted	Public funding available	Funding from companies prohibited	Limited anonymous funding permitted	In-kind donations permitted	No campaign spending limit or bans on types of expenditure in place	Online campaign included in campaign finance laws
Austria	limited			yes	limited		
Belgium					limited		no
Bulgaria			yes		unlimited		no
Croatia					limited		
Cyprus	unlimited	no			unlimited		
Czechia	limited				limited		
Denmark	unlimited	no		yes	unlimited	yes	no
Estonia		no	yes		no	yes	
Finland	limited	no			limited	yes	
France					unlimited		
Germany	unlimited			yes	unlimited	yes	no
Greece	limited				limited		no
Hungary		no			limited	yes	no
Ireland				yes	limited		no
Italy		no			unlimited		no
Latvia			yes		limited		
Lithuania			yes		limited	yes	
Luxembourg	unlimited		yes		unlimited	yes	
Malta	limited	no			limited		no
Netherlands				yes	unlimited	yes	no
Poland			yes		limited		
Portugal			yes		limited		
Romania					limited		
Slovakia		no			limited		
Slovenia	limited		yes		limited		
Spain			yes		limited	yes	
Sweden	unlimited			yes	unlimited	yes	no

WOMEN REPRESENTATION

Quota for Women on Candidate Lists (%)	Percentage women MEP elected 2024
	40.00%
50	40.91%
	23.53%
40	41.67%
	0%
	38.10%
	33.33%
	28.57%
	60.00%
50	50.62%
	36.46%
40	28.57%
	47.62%
	42.86%
50	32.89%
	22.22%
	18.18%
50 (incentive)	33.33%
	16.67%
	48.39%
35	28.30%
40	38.10%
equality	18.18%
	46.67%
40	33.33%
40	50.00%
	61.90%

TABLE 4: SEAT ALLOCATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Member State	total # of registered voters	Population (end of 2023)	EP mandates 2024	Inhabitants per mandate 2024	2024 deviation from median inhab/seat in %	EP mandates (post-Brexit)	Deviation from media inhab/seat in % (post-Brexit)	Changes in disproportionality (post-Brexit to 2024)
Austria	6,372,204	9,104,772	20	455,239	27%	19	37%	reduced
Belgium	8,537,902	11,742,796	22	533,763	14%	21	26%	reduced
Bulgaria	6,170,472	6,447,710	17	379,277	39%	17	43%	reduced
Croatia	3,524,179	3,850,894	12	320,908	49%	12	52%	reduced
Cyprus	683,432	920,701	6	153,450	75%	6	80%	reduced
Czechia	8,212,628	10,827,529	21	515,597	17%	21	31%	reduced
Denmark	4,301,255	5,932,654	15	395,510	37%	14	44%	reduced
Estonia	980,014	1,365,884	7	195,126	69%	7	75%	reduced
Finland	4,546,589	5,563,970	15	370,931	40%	14	46%	reduced
France	49,462,981	68,172,977	81	841,642	-35%	79	-16%	increased
Germany	61,963,020	84,358,845	96	878,738	-41%	96	-18%	increased
Greece	9,814,685	10,413,982	21	495,904	20%	21	30%	reduced
Hungary	7,803,603	9,599,744	21	457,131	27%	21	36%	reduced
Ireland	3,554,450	5,271,395	14	376,528	40%	13	49%	reduced
Italy	51,214,348	58,997,201	76	776,279	-25%	76	-9%	increased
Latvia	1,541,102	1,883,008	9	209,223	66%	8	66%	same
Lithuania	2,387,327	2,857,279	11	259,753	58%	11	65%	reduced
Luxembourg	319,410	660,809	6	110,135	82%	6	86%	reduced
Malta	370,184	542,051	6	90,342	86%	6	91%	reduced
Netherlands	13,542,363	17,811,291	31	574,558	8%	29	19%	reduced
Poland	29,098,155	36,753,736	53	693,467	-11%	52	0%	increased
Portugal	10,789,781	10,467,366	21	498,446	20%	21	33%	reduced
Romania	18,025,329	19,054,548	33	577,411	7%	33	19%	reduced
Slovakia	4,337,093	5,428,792	15	361,919	42%	14	47%	reduced
Slovenia	1,689,602	2,116,972	9	235,219	62%	8	64%	reduced
Spain	38,050,286	48,085,361	61	788,285	-26%	59	-8%	increased
Sweden	7,942,272	10,521,556	21	501,026	20%	21	35%	reduced

Grafy a tabulky (v rámci finálnej správy):

1. Oficiálne výsledky volieb do EP podľa členských štátov
2. Pravidlá pre volebné pozorovanie v EÚ
3. Volebné práva (1. Suffrage rights)
4. Spôsoby voľby (2. Voting)
5. Financovanie strán a kampane / Zastúpenie žien (3. Party and Campaign finance / Women representation)
6. Rozdelenie kresiel v Európskom parlamente (4. Seat allocation in the EP)

Volby do EP 2024 - Finálna správa Election Watch k voľbám do EP (6.-9. jún 2024) vo všetkých členských štátoch EÚ - [v angličtine](#).

Volby do EP 2019 - Finálna správa Election Watch k voľbám do EP (23.-26. máj 2019) vo všetkých členských štátoch EÚ - [v angličtine](#).