Russian Influence Operation in Kenya & South Africa

Authors: Davina Leonard, Tom Mboya, Ellison Shumba, Rasťo Kužel Photo: BARBARA DEBOUT/AFP via Getty Images

The report investigates Russian influence operations in Kenya and South Africa, revealing the use of Facebook to disseminate pro-Kremlin propaganda and manipulate public opinion.

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Traditional concepts of warfare have evolved beyond physical confrontations into the digital sphere. Modern tactics involve using online platforms to influence and manipulate public opinion. This report investigates the extent of Russian influence operations in Kenya and South Africa, focusing on the dissemination of pro-Kremlin propaganda through Facebook. The research explores the presence of Russian-aligned actors and their methods of spreading disinformation to shape positive perceptions of Russia and negative perceptions of the West.

#Key Findings

This report presents findings from a research study conducted in Kenya and South Africa, focusing on the dissemination of pro-Kremlin propaganda through Facebook. Russia has used social media platforms in other countries to influence public opinion through various networks and accounts, often disguised or operated by Kremlin-aligned actors. The primary objective of this research was to evaluate whether such a coordinated effort was established in both countries and to what extent diplomatic channels and means have or have not been part of such efforts.

We also monitored the content of Facebook posts spread by Russia in both countries to evaluate the extent to which disinformation narratives are present. This tactic has been observed in numerous regions, including but not limited to Africa, where false narratives are crafted to suit Russia's geopolitical interests.

A retrospective monitoring effort from March 19, 2023, to March 19, 2024, focused on analysing the social media landscape across Kenya and South Africa. This research utilised the public data provided by Facebook through the CrowdTangle tool, which primarily tracks public pages and groups, omitting private profiles or groups. Criteria for platform relevance included popularity, web traffic referrals, and Application Programming Interface (API) data accessibility.

The research proceeded in three phases: a desk study to identify relevant platforms, followed by data mining using the CrowdTangle tool to identify mentions of ‘Russia’ and ‘Putin’, network mapping using the Gephi tool to assess the scale of influence of pro-Russian actors, and finally, the analysis of Russian embassies' Facebook accounts in the two target countries. The monitoring of Russian embassies' Facebook accounts focused on the top 50 posts based on interactions.

The desk study focusing on the social media landscape identified that both Kenya and South Africa have substantial internet and social media usage, with South Africa showing higher penetration rates. In both countries, WhatsApp and Facebook are the leading social media platforms, with Facebook being a key driver of web traffic referrals.

Network mapping is used to establish a visual representation of a structure of connectivity based on specific criteria; the network map can then be used to explore the reach, extent, and actors involved in the found network map.  This study concerned itself with the potential existence of pro-Russian actors clustered on Facebook who would systematically disseminate and amplify pro-Kremlin content. The analysis did not reveal such coordinated dissemination of pro-Russian propaganda on Facebook in either Kenya or South Africa. The findings revealed that prominent legacy media outlets such as Nation and NTV Kenya, along with various other platforms of unclear authenticity or ownership, actively engaged in reporting and sharing content related to Russia or President Vladimir Putin on their Facebook profiles, indicating a diverse landscape of information dissemination on this topic.

Similar to Kenya, the network mapping analysis in South Africa revealed that established legacy media outlets such as SABC News and Daily Maverick, alongside various blogs and Facebook groups of unclear authenticity, actively engaged in reporting and sharing content related to Russia or President Vladimir Putin, indicating a convergence of narratives across different online communities and a potential connection between pro-Jacob Zuma groups and pro-Russian narratives.

The monitoring of Russian embassy Facebook accounts in both countries revealed a strategic narrative aimed at shaping positive perceptions of Russia and negative perceptions of the West. The narrative utilised cultural diplomacy, geopolitical messaging, and dissemination of propaganda and disinformation to foster support for Russian policies while positioning Russia as a defender against perceived Western imperialism.

The study revealed the use of official Russian embassy Facebook accounts in both countries to propagate false and misleading narratives, portraying Ukraine as a Nazi-controlled state and Russia as a victim. This tactic is aimed at legitimizing Russia's invasion while influencing public opinion in both Kenya and South Africa.

The monitored Russian embassy account in Kenya revealed efforts to highlight Russia's commitment to fostering a multipolar world order, prioritising cooperation with African nations, advocating for multilateralism, and emphasising the need for accountability for war crimes.

The monitoring of the Russian Embassy's Facebook account in South Africa revealed a focus on portraying Russia's historical support for African nations, economic progress within the BRICS group, recent diplomatic engagements with South Africa, domestic Russian affairs like record turnout during the recent presidential election and Navy Day celebrations, and cultural insights relating to landmarks such as the Moscow Metro.

The identified manipulative strategies underscore the importance of critical media literacy and the need for robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat the spread of disinformation and uphold the integrity of democratic discourse. They also raise questions about effective policy enforcement and moderation of false and misleading content.

The full report in pdf