24.11.2024
Elections
Experti MEMO 98 sa dlhodobo (od roku 1999) zúčastňujú volebných pozorovateľských misií a expertných hodnotiacich tímov. Počas viac ako 25 rokov mali možnosť participovať, predovšetkým v rámci OBSE/ODIHR a EÚ, ale aj v tímoch iných medzinárodných organizácií, na viac ako 150 misiách, a to v rozličných pozíciách (zástupca šéfa misie, mediálny analytik, analytik sociálnych médií, politický analytik, hovorca). Zároveň MEMO 98 pravidelne poskytuje expertnú bázu a spoluprácu mnohým volebným a hodnotiacim misiám pôsobiacim na Slovensku.
V posledných týždňoch svoje záverčné správy týkajúce sa slovenského volebného procesu v roku 2024 zverejnenili pozorovateľské misie dvoch medzinárodných organizácii - OSCE/ODIHR (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) a Election Watch.
Nižšie nájdete ich krátky prehlaď (stručné zhrnutie, zvýraznenia hlavných zistení je dielom MEMO 98, a odporúčania) v angličtine (preklad bude k dispozícii v priebehu decembra).
Finálna správa misie OBSE/ODIHR zverejnená 22. novembra je dostupná na tomto linku. Iné finálne správy volebných misií OBSE/ODIHR na Slovensku (naposledy pri parlamentných voľbách 2023) sú dostupné na tomto linku. Nižšie nájdete stručné zhrnutie a odporúčania (tieto časti aj v originále - Executive Summary and Recommendations).
Na pozvanie orgánov Slovenskej republiky a v súlade so svojím mandátom vyslal Úrad pre demokratické inštitúcie a ľudské práva OBSE tím volebných expertov (ODIHR EET) na pozorovanie prezidentských volieb v roku 2024. ODIHR EET zameral svoje hodnotenie na vedenie kampane, vrátane sociálnych sietí, reguláciu a dohľad nad financovaním kampane a prácu médií. ODIHR EET posudzoval súlad týchto aspektov volebného procesu so záväzkami OBSE, inými medzinárodnými záväzkami a štandardmi pre demokratické voľby, ako aj vnútroštátnymi právnymi predpismi.
Voľby sa konali v súťaživom a pluralistickom duchu a s rešpektom k základným slobodám a ponúkli voličom možnosť výberu zo širokého spektra navzájom odlišných politických alternatív. Stieranie hranice medzi povinnosťami verejných činiteľov a vedením kampane a prípady zakázaného vedenia kampane tretími stranami však viedlo k zníženej rovnosti podmienok pre všetkých kandidátov. Napriek zavedeným pravidlám transparentnosti financovania volebných kampaní pretrvávajúce medzery a nedostatočný dohľad a vymáhanie práva vytvárajú priestor pre netransparentné praktiky a obmedzenú zodpovednosť za obchádzanie pravidiel. Médiá pokrývali kampaň rozsiahlym spôsobom a prostredníctvom rôznych formátov, zatiaľ čo celkové mediálne prostredie bolo čoraz viac ovplyvňované nepriateľstvom voči kritickým médiám, obťažovaním novinárov a pokusmi o politický vplyv na redakčné politiky a zásady.
Kampaň odzrkadľovala polarizáciu a základné pro- a protivládne rozdelenie a z väčšej časti sa odohrávala v súvislosti so zahraničnopolitickým smerovaním krajiny, ktoré by zvolil novozvolený prezident, ako aj zabezpečenia rovnováhy síl. Vojna na Ukrajine sa stala nástrojom v kampani, najmä pred druhým kolom volieb, prostredníctvom komunikácie, ktorá prezentovala jedného z hlavných kandidátov, Ivana Korčoka, ako vojnového štváča. Volebné programy kandidátov v kampani obsahovali väčšinou všeobecné zmienky o opatreniach zameraných na ženy, osoby so zdravotným postihnutím a menšiny. Pozitívom bolo, že, na rozdiel od predchádzajúcich parlamentných volieb, kampaň zostala celkovo zdvorilá a kandidáti sa do značnej miery vyhýbali použitiu agresívneho, štvavého alebo netolerantného jazyka, a to aj voči rôznym zraniteľným skupinám v spoločnosti. Počas kampane sa víťazný kandidát Peter Pellegrini, ktorého podporili vládne koaličné strany, spoliehal na kombinovanú pozíciu a svoje početné vystúpenia ako predsedu Národnej rady, pričom čerpal výhody z viditeľnosti a posilneného imidžu činorodého štátnika.
Zákonné predpisy o financovaní kampane poskytujú celkovo primeraný rámec pre zverejňovanie a zodpovednosť vrátane požiadavky, aby kandidáti používali transparentné bankové účty pre všetky transakcie uskutočnené v rámci kampane. Účinnosť týchto ustanovení však bola oslabená netransparentnými hromadnými platbami PR agentúram, príspevkami politických strán, ktoré neodhalili skutočných darcov, nezohľadnením nepeňažnej podpory poskytnutej kandidátom a zakázanými výdavkami tretích strán. Napriek niekoľkým obvineniam a sťažnostiam na nezrovnalosti vo financovaní kampane neprijalo ministerstvo vnútra (MV) ako orgán dohľadu počas kampane žiadne nápravné opatrenia. MV tiež nie je povinné zverejňovať žiadne správy o svojej činnosti v oblasti monitorovania a vymáhania práva v súvislosti s povolebnými správami o financovaní kampane kandidátov, čo oslabuje celkovú transparentnosť. Široko koncipovaná zodpovednosť MV, ktorú stanovujú pravidlá dohľadu nad financovaním volebnej kampane, je v rozpore s dobrou volebnou praxou, čo ešte viac zdôrazňuje dôležitosť zverenia tejto povinnosti nezávislému orgánu.
Sloboda prejavu sa celkovo rešpektuje, ale v rozpore s medzinárodnými záväzkami zostáva ohováranie naďalej trestným činom. Mediálne prostredie je pluralitné, ale koncentrácia hlavných mediálnych domov vyvoláva obavy o ich redakčnú nezávislosť. Absencia transparentného mechanizmu na zdávanie štátnych zákaziek v oblasti reklamy ďalej zhoršuje zraniteľnosť mediálneho trhu. Boli vznesené obavy o nezávislosť verejnoprávnych médií z dôvodu ich nedostatočného financovania a pokusov o politickú kontrolu prostredníctvom novoprijatého zákona po nedávnych parlamentných voľbách. Okrem toho časté útoky na médiá a zastrašovanie novinárov, často aj zo strany kľúčových politických aktérov, predstavujú významné riziká pre pluralitu médií. Manipulatívny obsah a nepravdivé informácie sa šíria prostredníctvom niektorých online médií známych šírením dezinformácií a na sociálnych sieťach, ale len v obmedzenom rozsahu pochádzajú z profilov súvisiacich s kandidátmi.
V súlade s metodikou ODIHR EET nevykonal komplexné pozorovanie volebných postupov počas samotného dňa konania volieb. V obmedzenom počte navštívených volebných miestností bol volebný proces riadne usporiadaný a kompetentní členovia komisií ho riadili s istotou a nestranným spôsobom. Mnohé navštívené volebné miestnosti neboli bezbariérové pre osoby so zníženou pohyblivosťou. Výsledky volieb boli zverejnené rýchlo a transparentne, s rozdelením podľa volebných miestností.
Táto správa ponúka odporúčania na podporu úsilia o ďalšie zosúladenie volieb v Slovenskej republike so záväzkami OBSE a ďalšími medzinárodnými záväzkami a štandardmi pre demokratické konanie volieb. Odporúčania sa zameriavajú na potrebu lepšieho zabezpečenia oddelenia funkcií verejných činiteľov od vedenia kampane, zlepšenia regulácie výdavkových limitov, tretie strany a povinností pri podávaní správ, zabezpečenia včasnej nápravy nezrovnalostí, dekriminalizácie ohovárania, zaručenia transparentnosti pri rozdeľovaní štátom zadávanej reklamy a zabezpečenia nezávislosti a slobodného prostredia pre prácu médií a novinárov. ODIHR je pripravený pomáhať štátnym orgánom pri ďalšom
zlepšovaní volebného procesu a realizácii odporúčaní obsiahnutých v tejto a predchádzajúcich správach.
1. V záujme zvýšenia účasti žien na verejnom živote by sa orgány mali zaoberať rodovými stereotypmi prostredníctvom komplexných právnych, inštitucionálnych a vzdelávacích opatrení. Politické strany a iní zainteresovaní aktéri by mali identifikovať a zamedziť rodovo motivovanému diskriminačnému slovníku a krokom, ktoré vedú k negatívnemu zobrazovaniu žien a majú dopad na ich rovnoprávnu účasť na verejnom živote.
2. V záujme harmonizácie právneho rámca a zabezpečenia nestrannosti by registráciou prezidentských kandidátov mala byť poverená Štátna komisia pre voľby. Zákon by mal stanoviť
postupy na preskúmanie predložených návrhov a schvaľovanie návrhov na kandidátov.
3. Lehota na odstúpenie kandidátov by sa mala preskúmať s cieľom poskytnúť dostatočný čas na zohľadnenie týchto zmien na vytlačených hlasovacích lístkoch. Mala by sa zlepšiť informovanosť voličov a komunikácia o odstúpení kandidátov, aby sa podporila možnosť odovzdávať platné hlasy na základe komplexných informácií.
4. Zákon by mal zabezpečiť jasné oddelenie oficiálnych funkcií od účasti v kampani, aby sa zabránilo kandidátom, ktorí sú verejní činitelia využívať výhody úradu na volebné účely. Ako už bolo odporúčané, mali by sa zvážiť ustanovenia o zákaze využívania verejných zdrojov na účely kampane. To by mohlo zahŕňať zákaz zavádzania programov sociálnej starostlivosti
financovaných z verejných finančných prostriedkov počas trvania oficiálnej časti kampane.
5. Porušenia zákona v súvislosti s kampaňou by sa mali bezodkladne riešiť, a to aj prostredníctvom včasných nápravných opatrení a uloženia primeraných a odstrašujúcich sankcií.
6. Príslušné orgány by mali v spolupráci s rómskymi organizáciami vypracovať dlhodobé programy občianskeho vzdelávania a informovanosti o voľbách s cieľom podporiť zmysluplnú a
informovanú volebnú účasť rómskych voličov.
7. V záujme ďalšieho zvýšenia transparentnosti a zodpovednosti by mal zákon komplexne regulovať využívanie úverov prezidentskými kandidátmi.
8. V súlade s osvedčenými postupmi by výdavkové limity mohli byť určované formou indexácie alebo byť pravidelne preskúmané s cieľom zohľadniť infláciu.
9. Zákaz financovania kampaní tretími stranami by sa mal preskúmať s cieľom dosiahnuť rovnováhu medzi zabezpečením slobody prejavu a zároveň stanovením primeraných limitov výdavkov tretích strán, aby sa zabránilo neprimeranému ovplyvňovaniu priebehu volebných kampaní.
10. Ustanovenia pre správy o financovaní kampane zo strany kandidátov by mali vyžadovať zverejnenie informácií o prijatých finančných daroch, a to aj darov od politických strán. S cieľom umožniť overenie informácií o prijatých nepeňažných príspevkoch a bezplatných službách by sa od uchádzačov mohlo vyžadovať, aby k správam o financovaní kampane pripojili podrobne rozpísané záznamy o takýchto príspevkoch vrátane nepeňažnej podpory poskytovanej politickými stranami.
11. S cieľom posilniť dohľad a zvýšiť transparentnosť by mohlo byť Ministerstvo vnútra zákonom poverené vypracovaním a zverejnením záverov o svojej činnosti v oblasti monitorovania a vymáhania práva v súvislosti so správami kandidátov o financovaní kampane v primeranom časovom rámci.
12. Zodpovednosťou za dohľad nad financovaním kampane by mohol byť poverený nezávislý orgán.
13. Zadávanie štátnej reklamy by malo byť transparentné, nediskriminačné a regulované na základe jasných a objektívnych kritérií.
14. Na ochranu verejnoprávneho vysielateľa pred politickým vplyvom by sa mali v právnych predpisoch a v praxi zaviesť primerané záruky, aby sa zaručila jeho redakčná nezávislosť,
finančná udržateľnosť a vymenovanie profesionálnych, politicky nezávislých riadiacich a dozorných orgánov.
15. Zodpovedné orgány by mali urýchlene vyšetrovať hrozby namierené voči novinárom, vrátane online prostredia. Aktéri v politickom dianí by sa mali zdržať používania hanlivého alebo agresívneho jazyka zacieleného na novinárov, čo môže podporovať takéto útoky.
16. Ako už bolo odporúčané v minulosti, ohováranie by malo byť v súlade s medzinárodnými záväzkami týkajúcimi sa slobody prejavu dekriminalizované.
Following an invitation from the authorities of the Slovak Republic and in accordance with its mandate, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) deployed an Election Expert Team (EET) for the 2024 presidential election. The ODIHR EET focused its assessment on the conduct of the campaign, including on social networks, campaign finance regulation and oversight, and the work of the media. The ODIHR EET assessed compliance of these aspects of the electoral process with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as national legislation.
The election was competitive and pluralistic, conducted with respect for fundamental freedoms and offering voters a choice of distinct political alternatives. However, the blurring of the line between the duties of public officials and campaigning and cases of prohibited third-party campaigning lessened the equality of conditions for all candidates. Despite campaign finance transparency rules in place, remaining gaps and insufficient oversight and enforcement leave space for non-transparent practices and limited accountability for evasion. Media covered the campaign extensively through various formats, while the overall media environment has been increasingly affected by the animosity towards critical media, harassment of journalists, and attempts of political influence on editorial policies.
The campaign reflected the polarization and underlying pro- and anti-government divisions, revolving mostly around the course the president would take in foreign policy and ensuring the balance of powers. The war in Ukraine was instrumentalized, especially before the second round, through messaging presenting one of the main contenders, Ivan Korčok, as a warmonger. Candidates' campaign programmes contained mostly generic mentions of measures targeting women, persons with disabilities, and minorities. Positively, in contrast to the preceding parliamentary elections, the campaign remained overall courteous, and candidates largely avoided the use of aggressive, inflammatory, or intolerant rhetoric, including towards various vulnerable societal groups.Throughout the campaign, the winning candidate, Peter Pellegrini, endorsed by the governing coalition parties, relied on the combined role and numerous appearances as the Speaker of Parliament, profiting from the visibility and the boosted image of an effective statesperson.
Campaign finance regulations provide an overall adequate disclosure and accountability framework, including the requirement for candidates to use transparent bank accounts for all campaign transactions. However, the effectiveness of these provisions was undermined by non-transparent bulk payments to PR agencies, contributions from political parties not revealing the actual donors, unaccounted-for in-kind support, and prohibited third-party spending. Despite several allegations and complaints about campaign finance irregularities, no corrective action was taken during the campaign by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) as the oversight body. Detracting from transparency, the MoI is also not required to publish any reports on its monitoring and enforcement activities concerning candidates' post-election campaign reports. Its broad responsibility, set by the campaign finance oversight rules, is contrary to good electoral practice, underscoring the importance of vesting this duty with an independent body.
Freedom of expression is respected overall, but at odds with international obligations, defamation remains a criminal offence. The media landscape is pluralistic, yet the concentration of major outlets raises concerns about their editorial independence. The absence of a transparent mechanism for the distribution of state advertising further exacerbates the vulnerability of the media market. Concerns about the independence of the public service media have been raised due to its insufficient funding and attempts at political control through a newly adopted law following the elections. Furthermore, frequent attacks on media and intimidation of journalists, often by key political figures, pose significant risks to media pluralism. Manipulative content and false information circulated on certain online media known for spreading disinformation and on social networks but only to a limited extent originated from candidate-affiliated profiles.
In line with ODIHR's methodology, the EET did not undertake a comprehensive observation of election-day procedures. In a limited number of polling stations visited, the voting process was orderly and administered confidently and impartially by knowledgeable commission members. Many polling premises visited were not barrier-free for persons with reduced mobility. Election results were released swiftly and transparently, with a polling station breakdown.
This report offers recommendations to support efforts to further align elections in the Slovak Republic with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. Recommendations focus on the need to better ensure the separation between public functions and campaigning, improve regulations on spending limits, third parties, and reporting requirements, provide a timely remedy against irregularities, decriminalize defamation, guarantee transparency in the distribution of state advertising, and to ensure the independence and free environment for the work of the media and journalists. ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities in further improving the electoral process and addressing the recommendations in this and previous reports.
These recommendations, as contained throughout the text, are offered with a view to further enhance the conduct of elections in the Slovak Republic and to support efforts to bring them fully in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections. These recommendations should be read in conjunction with past ODIHR recommendations that remain to be addressed. The legislative reforms should be undertaken well in advance of elections and through an inclusive consultation, including with civil society. ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities of the Slovak Republic to further improve the electoral process and to address recommendations contained in this and previous reports.
1. To enhance women's participation in public life, authorities should address gender stereotypes through comprehensive legal, institutional, and educational measures. Political parties and other stakeholders should identify and curb gender-based discriminatory rhetoric and actions that lead to the negative portrayal of women and affect their equal participation.
2. To harmonize the legal framework and to ensure impartiality, the State Election Commission should be entrusted with the registration of presidential candidates. The law should prescribe procedures for the review of submitted applications and the approval of candidacies.
3. The deadline for the withdrawal of candidates should be reviewed to allow sufficient time for reflecting the changes on printed ballots. Voter information and communication about the withdrawals should be improved to support voters' ability to cast valid and fully informed votes.
4. The law should provide for a clear separation between official functions and campaigning to prevent candidates and public officials from using the advantage of office for electoral
purposes. As previously recommended, provisions to ban the use of public resources for campaign purposes should be considered. This could include a prohibition on initiating social
welfare programmes through public funds during the official campaign periods.
5. Campaign-related violations should be promptly addressed, including through timely remedial action and the imposition of proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
6. Relevant authorities should develop, in co-operation with Roma organizations, long-term civic education and election awareness programmes to encourage meaningful and informed electoral participation by Roma voters.
7. To further enhance transparency and accountability, the law should comprehensively regulate the use of loans by presidential candidates.
8. In line with good practice, the spending limits could be based on a form of indexation or regularly reviewed to account for inflation.
9. The ban on third-party campaign financing should be reviewed to balance between ensuring the freedom of expression while, at the same time, setting reasonable limits on third-party spending to prevent undue distortion of the campaign.
10. Provisions for campaign reporting by candidates should require the disclosure of information on financial donations received, including from political parties. To enable the verification of information in reports about in-kind contributions and gratuitous services received, candidates could be required to attach the itemized records about such contributions, including in-kind support provided by political parties, to financial reports.
11. To strengthen oversight and to enhance transparency, the Ministry of Interior could be mandated by law to prepare and publish the conclusions on its monitoring and enforcement
activities in connection with candidates' financial reports within a reasonable timeframe.
12. An independent body could be vested with campaign finance oversight responsibilities.
13. The allocation of state advertising should be transparent, non-discriminatory, and regulated based on clear and objective criteria.
14. To protect the public broadcaster from political influence, adequate safeguards should be introduced in law and in practice to guarantee its editorial independence, financial sustainability, and the appointment of professional, politically unaffiliated management and oversight bodies.
15. Authorities should swiftly investigate threats, including online, against journalists. Political actors should refrain from the use of derogatory or aggressive language targeting journalists, which may encourage such attacks.
16. As previously recommended, defamation should be decriminalized, in line with international obligations on freedom of expression.
Prezidentské voľby 2024 - Finálna správa volebného expertného tímu OBSE/ODIHR k prezidentským voľbám 2024 (23. marec a 6. apríl 2024) - v slovenčine, v angličtine.
Predčasné parlamentné voľby 2023 - Finálna správa volebnej pozorovateľskej misie OBSE/ODIHR k predčasným parlamentným voľbám 2023 (30. september 2023) - v slovenčine, v angličtine.
Organizácia Election Watch zverejnila svoju finálnu správa (zatiaľ iba v angličtine) k voľbám do Európskeho parlamentu (EP) 30. septembra, a je dostupná na tomto linku. Správa analyzuje podmienky volebných procesov a aplikáciu volebných pravidiel vo všetkých 27 členských štátoch Európskej únie. MEMO 98 sa misie zúčastnilo ako expert za Slovensko (misia predstavila svoju predbežnú správu 10. júna, viac na tomto linku). Nižšie nájdete stručné zhrnutie (Executive Summary) a odporúčania (Recommendations).
Democracy was tested on various levels in the 10th European Parliament (EP) elections. A total of 355 million eligible voters across the 27 Member States (MS) elected 720 Members of the EP to represent the more than 425 million European citizens for the next five years. National political parties and candidates campaigned increasingly on shared European issues, but with little visibility of their European political families and their lead candidates in MS. Acts of violence against politicians in some MS were a pronounced sign of a growing societal polarisation, compounded by fears of a wider political rift and concerns about foreign interference.
European Union (EU) bodies have initiated and advanced electoral reforms, enhancing the broader rights framework. Yet, significant differences and restrictions on voting and candidacy
rights remain, and important reforms aimed at increasing the cohesion of electoral rules and procedures across the Union have yet to be completed. The distribution of the 720 EP seats among MS for the next term meets EU Treaty requirements and reduced disparities in the weight of the vote between MS, but a permanent seat distribution method based on objective criteria remains to be developed by 2026. Suffrage rights were expanded in a few MS. Belgium and Germany joined Austria and Malta in lowering the voting age to 16 years, resulting in a total of two million eligible voters below the age of 18. Belgium also reduced the candidacy age to 18, while it remained 25 in Greece and Italy.
The elections were administered by the 27 national election authorities and enjoyed high public trust overall. The European cooperation network on elections (ECNE) has become a valuable forum for facilitating contacts between MS, mutual learning, and inspiring improvements. National representatives are increasingly coordinating and exchanging on good electoral practices. In the absence of a centralised European voter register, data exchange among MS on possible multiple entries remains a challenge, not least because data about dual citizenship is not available. Overall, the confidence in voter registration procedures for the European elections is high, with the notable exception of Hungary and to a lesser extent Poland.
The proportional representation system is unequally implemented across MS, and there are different thresholds in place to obtain a mandate. Six MS do not foresee a preferential vote. Cyprus recently abolished compulsory voting, which remains in laws in four MS. Although mostly not enforced, disproportionate fines envisaged include a temporary withdrawal of voting rights for repeated abstention (Belgium) and one-year imprisonment (Greece). Most EU countries offer voters advance and alternative voting options, such as voting from abroad, by post, or using a mobile ballot box, but access to alternative voting modalities and the number of options available still vary greatly. Four MS (Czechia, Ireland, Malta, Slovakia) do not offer any possibility of voting from abroad to their citizens.
Special measures foster electoral inclusion and representation among marginalised groups. Eleven countries have legislated quotas for women and some, like Italy, Spain and Portugal reinforce their effect through rank-order rules. With up to 25 million young people eligible to vote for the first time, youth candidates were not listed in electable positions in 15 MS, highlighting remaining barriers. There is no unified approach to citizenship education across the EU and youth remains underrepresented in EU decision-making, with 50 as average age of MEPs in the newly elected EP. Some EU MS provide special measures to facilitate electoral participation of national minorities, however Roma, Europe’s largest ethnic minority, have lost any direct political representation in the EP and measures to facilitate their political participation remain insufficient.
Participation of persons with disabilities in elections has improved and since 2019, Germany, France, Slovenia and Luxembourg have abolished restrictions on voting rights for persons under guardianship, to align with international obligations. Nevertheless, 13 MS do not grant voting rights, and even more restrict candidacy for persons under guardianship. Several countries improved their legislation to explicitly require polling station accessibility and ballot readability but accessibility remains an issue in most MS, especially in Cyprus and Malta.
Around 11 million mobile EU citizens (EU citizens living in another MS) were eligible to vote either in their country of residence or citizenship. Their turnout has been low in the past, and data about their participation remains opaque. Their registration in host countries is hampered by language barriers, a variety of registration deadlines, and administrative requirements. Mobile EU citizens could also stand as candidates in their country of residence, although procedures vary by MS. Comprehensive reforms to the EU directives to enhance the participation of mobile EU citizens are pending finalisation.
Around 18,400 candidates and 490 candidate lists stood on the ballots, competing under unequal conditions across the MS. Candidate registration and campaign periods ranged from several months to a few weeks, and independent individual candidacy is not possible in nine MS. Most national political parties have joined a European Political Party (EUPP), which nominated lead candidates (Spitzenkandidaten) for their campaigns, but followed different procedures in that regard.
A detailed campaign finance reporting framework overseen by an independent European authority enhances transparency and oversight of EUPPs, which are largely financed through public funding from the EU, with a steep increase to EUR 50 million available for grants in 2024. In contrast to the rules for monitoring donations, the authority does not have systematic access to activities-related expenditure information during the campaign.
The bulk of campaign expenditure takes place at the national level. National laws and regulations for political finance vary widely, with public funding, considered as a measure to enhance equality, not available in all MS. Ten MS do not have any campaign spending limits or bans on types of campaign expenditure in place. Requirements to reveal the sources and amounts of contributions, the purpose and amounts of expenses, and to make relevant reports timely and publicly available also differ. Sanctions for campaign finance violations do not appear effective, dissuasive and proportionate, and the oversight body for campaign finance is not seen as fully independent, impartial and transparent in several MS.
Online campaigning is covered by regulations in 16 MS, and the new European regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising will provide further guidance once fully in effect. The EU has adopted new legislation to regulate digital service providers, and the EC together with the new national Digital Services Coordinators (DSC), oversees enforcement. While most MS appointed these coordinators, twelve MS either had not designated the competent authority as DSC, or did not empower these authorities to perform the tasks required by the Act, or both. The EC took decisive action to hold these MS accountable by opening infringement procedures and has also begun investigating large online platforms, including deceptive political advertising and the discontinuation of a monitoring tool. A self-regulatory regime against disinformation has been set up to prevent, detect, take down or label disinformation online, accompanied by various fact checking initiatives and hybrid threat response mechanisms to protect against information manipulation and interference.
While the EU generally remains a safe space for free and independent media, there are concerns pertaining to cases of arrests, surveillance, political pressure, and violence against journalists, as well as media ownership concentration. With another recently adopted legislation the EU attempts to protect media independence, freedom and pluralism, as well as journalists and non-governmental organisations from abusive cross-border lawsuits intended to silence or intimidate them.
European institutions emphasise the important role of civil society in safeguarding and promoting human rights and take measures to protect civic space. Yet, multiple civic space infringements have been reported for a number of MS, with the most concerning trends in Hungary and Slovakia. Non-partisan election observers have been globally recognised as human rights defenders, and the EC has urged MS to enable both international and citizen observation. Yet, only 7 MS have legal frameworks for both, and 9 MS do not have any provisions for election observation. Election-Watch.EU has applied in all 27 MS as international and citizen election observers and received accreditation in 13 MS.
The EP adjusted European turnout figures on its results website from 51.05 to 50.76 percent in September. There is still scope to improve accessibility to essential election information at European level and in most MS. All but two MS (Germany and Malta) publish detailed election results per polling station, in polling stations or online, to enhance transparency and public confidence. Electoral dispute resolution in the European elections is predominantly a matter for responsible national institutions. At least half of the MS define narrowly what complaints can be filed before election day. Decisions on final election results in seven MS are not subject to review and appeal in courts, which is at odds with international standards.
The 21 recommendations of this EAM report focus on advancing electoral reforms across the EU. Key proposals include intensifying collaboration between European institutions and MS to address inconsistencies in national electoral regulations and harmonising voting eligibility criteria. Recommendations emphasise increasing accessibility for persons with disabilities, enhancing women’s participation, and promoting the inclusion of national minorities, youth, and mobile EU citizens. Efforts should be made to harmonise voter and candidate registration, enhance the European character of campaigns, and improve campaign finance transparency and oversight. Strengthening media freedom and the implementation of the new social media regulations are also recommended, along with the need for more robust mechanisms to handle electoral complaints, ensure independent election observation, and publish detailed election results to promote transparency and public trust.
Electoral reform process
1. European institutions and Member States need to intensify their collaborative efforts to advance the pending electoral reforms. It is essential to address past recommendations and persistent issues, including the lack of uniformity in national electoral regulations and the differing timelines for key electoral processes, which adversely impact the equality of rights and opportunities.
Electoral system
2. Sustained efforts are needed to identify a permanent method for the distribution of EP seats among Member States. In line with international good practice, the distribution
should be based on clear, transparent, and objective criteria and ensure transnational equality of the weight of the vote, while reconciling with EU Treaty requirements.
Suffrage rights
3. Reforms of electoral legislation at EU and Member State levels should continue to prioritise the widening and more uniform availability of advance and alternative voting methods to Union citizens.
4. To promote equality in voting and candidacy rights across the EU and reduce disparities in national suffrage approaches, renewed efforts should focus on establishing additional common European minimum eligibility criteria for voters and candidates. These criteria should aim to harmonise requirements for the minimum voting age, residency, independent candidacy, and permissible restrictions on suffrage rights.
Persons with disabilities
5. To enhance accessibility and inclusion of persons with disabilities in elections, it is essential to implement alternative voting methods such as postal and mobile voting, ensure physical accessibility of polling stations, and provide election information in multiple accessible formats. Additionally, training election staff, deploying assistive technologies, and engaging with Disabled Persons Organizations can significantly improve electoral participation for persons with disabilities.
Women participation
6. The EU and Member States should continue efforts to increase the participation and epresentation of women through legislative and voluntary measures. The collection and
publication of gender-disaggregated data on electoral aspects should be further encouraged.
Inclusion of national minorities
7. To facilitate the inclusion of disadvantaged communities, the European institutions and its Member States should engage in increased awareness raising for the electoral participation of national minorities, including the Roma, and of other underprivileged groups, and should encourage special measures for their participation. Particular focus could be given to the use of minority languages for electoral materials and voter information.
Youth inclusion
8. The EU and its Member States should provide civic and voter education to young and first-time voters, including through school curricula and practical vote simulations, in a manner
to ensure that no young voter is left behind.
Participation of mobile EU citizens
9. For enhanced inclusion of mobile EU citizens in European elections, Member States could streamline online registration, provide multilingual information, simplify registration procedures and raise public awareness, while harmonising further cut off dates for registration and strengthening data exchange mechanisms.
Voter registration
10. To enhance the accuracy, inclusivity and integrity of voter registers in European elections, it is recommended that the EU and Member States consider further harmonisation of voter
registration procedures, data format, and data exchange, while starting to identify double/multiple EU citizenship and conducting regular audits.
Candidate registration
11. Harmonising conditions for candidacy, including registration procedures and timelines, could enhance equality of chances and intraparty democratic practices in the European Parliament elections.
Campaign
12. To strengthen the European dimension of electoral campaigns and ensure equal opportunities for all candidates, efforts could be intensified to increase the visibility of European Political Parties, including on ballot papers, and harmonise electoral campaign regulations across all Member States.
Campaign finance
13. European institutions and Member States could jointly review the applicable rules for political party and campaign finance and its transparency and oversight, especially with regards to expenditure limits and disclosure requirements, and applicable sanctions in case of non-compliance.
14. Further consideration could be given to clarify the institutional responsibilities of oversight bodies and equip the respective independent authorities with sufficient powers to exercise
their mandates, including the scrutiny of incomes, expenditures, and types of campaign activities.
Media environment
15. To foster media freedom and pluralism in Member States, the EC should monitor the enforcement of the European Media Freedom Act and in particular, verify how Member States implement measures to ensure that media have appropriate financial and technical resources to operate independently of political or corporate influence.
16. To enhance protection against the misuse of criminal and civil defamation laws, which are representing an essential threat to freedom of expression and journalistic freedom, the EC
should oversee the transposition of the Anti-SLAPP Directive in national legislations and closely monitor its implementation.
Social media regulation
17. Continued efforts are necessary to ensure the full implementation of the DSA across all Member States. This includes providing adequate support and resources to national authorities, fostering collaboration and best practices, and conducting regular assessments to monitor progress and address any challenges promptly.
18. Online platforms should ensure transparency by adhering to agreed commitments and implementing DSA rules and mitigation measures. They must enhance efforts in combating information manipulation activities by improving mechanisms and establishing a multi-stakeholder approach through working groups and open discussions. Comprehensive, real-time data access needs to be provided to researchers for systematic monitoring and analysis, while maintaining user privacy and data security.
Complaints and appeals
19. Common guidelines on the handling of electoral disputes could be developed at the EU level. Reforms in Member States could prioritise the introduction of expedited deadlines to provide timely redress in electoral matters and ensuring a recourse to court against administrative decisions, including regarding final election results.
Election observation
20. To safeguard independent oversight, all Member States should include provisions in their legislation to explicitly allow access and accreditation of non-partisan election observers
throughout the electoral process according to international principles.
Election results
21. To enhance transparency and independent oversight, Election Management Bodies should consistently publish detailed election results, including polling station data, the number of invalid votes, and data on voter demographics such as double citizens. Procedures for the aggregation of election results and calculation of voter turnout by the European Parliament should be clearly outlined and published.
Charts & Tables (within the Final report):
Grafy a tabuľky (v rámci finálnej správy):
1. Oficiálne výsledky volieb do EP podľa členských štátov
2. Pravidlá pre volebné pozorovanie v EÚ
3. Volebné práva (1. Suffrage rights)
4. Spôsoby voľby (2. Voting)
5. Financovanie strán a kampane / Zastúpenie žien (3. Party and Campaign finance / Women representation)
6. Rozdelenie kresiel v Európskom parlamente (4. Seat allocation in the EP)
Voľby do EP 2024 - Finálna správa Election Watch k voľbám do EP (6.-9. jún 2024) vo všetkých členských štátoch EÚ - v angličtine.
Voľby do EP 2019 - Finálna správa Election Watch k voľbám do EP (23.-26. máj 2019) vo všetkých členských štátoch EÚ - v angličtine.
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